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CHAPTER 3 
Torts 
ROBERT J. SHERER 
A. COURT DECISIONS 
§3.1. Foreseeable occurrence. In Ellingsgard v. Silver,1 the hired 
operator of a lake resort motor boat suffered a fatal heart attack while 
operating a motor boat. The boat, out of control, struck a dock upon 
which the plaintiff was standing, injuring the plaintiff. In an action 
against the resort owner, as employer of the driver, the plaintiff argued 
that the operator's heart attack was reasonably foreseeable. Therefore, 
it was foreseeable that the driver would be incompetent to operate the 
boat and hence, the defendant was negligent in hiring the operator. 
The Supreme Judicial Court rejected this argument. Although the 
evidence was that he had suffered four previous heart attacks, one of 
them several months prior to the fatal attack, the Court held that 
it could have been inferred from this evidence that it was fore-
seeable that [the employee] was likely to continue to suffer heart 
attacks similar to his previous ones. But there was no evidence that 
Brace had ever suffered a lapse of consciousness as a result of his 
heart condition, or that he was physically unable to stop what he 
was doing without mishap and call a doctor when the symptoms 
occurred. Nor was there any medical testimony that his next attack 
was likely to be severe and incapacitating.2 
Thus, the Court's opinion suggests that foreseeability of incapacity 
from a heart seizure will be proven only where medical testimony 
indicates that (1) previous seizures resulted in an incapacity similar 
to that which occurred when the alleged tort was committed, or (2) 
the previous seizures, while not themselves incapacitating, indicated to a 
reasonable man that future seizures might well be incapacitating.s The 
Court was unwilling to hold that even a mild heart seizure could por-
tend a future incapacitating seizure without strong medical evidence. 
The Court, possibly, was thinking of the possible impact of a different 
result on the lives of heart victims and their employers when it rea-
soned that "to hold the contrary would impose a severe limitation 
ROBERT J. SHERER is a member of the firm of Roche and Leen, Boston. 
§3.I. 11967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 263, 223 N.E.2d 813. 
21967 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 266, 223 N.E.2d at 816. 
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upon the substantial number of persons who, with medical advice and 
treatment, attempt to live moderately normal lives despite heart con-
ditions and other infirmities."4 
In Beaver v. Costin,5 a passenger in an automobile was injured when 
struck by flying dirt and rocks ejected from a power lawn mower being 
operated by the defendant on the side of the road. At the trial, the 
defendant admitted that he was aware that the mower was capable of 
throwing debris considerable distances and that sand and gravel were 
often left near the street by passing trucks. Thus, the defendant was 
aware of the risk in operating the mower near the highway. In revers-
ing the trial judge's directed verdict for the defendant, the Court ruled 
that "the jury would have been warranted in finding that the de-
fendant should have foreseen that the operation of a power mower in 
a manner which allowed rocks and other debris to be thrown into the 
road traveled by others created an unreasonable risk of harm."6 This 
proposition appears to be rather fundamental. 
At first glance, the Court in Silver appears to develop a test for fore-
seeability of risk to others which is far stricter than the one in Beaver. 
Silver requires specific evidence which indicates a likelihood of future 
incapacitating heart seizures. Beaver, on the other hand, allows the 
jury great latitude in inferring foreseeability from the facts as given. 
If the Beaver test had been applied in Silver, then the jury should 
have been allowed to infer from the medical testimony whether or not 
the incapacitating heart seizure was foreseeable. Instead, the Court di-
rected a defendant's verdict as to foreseeability. 
The cases, however, may be distinguishable for two reasons. First, the 
Court in Silver may have felt that the question of the foreseeability of 
the risk caused by a heart seizure should be withdrawn from the jury 
because of the highly technical nature of the issue. Moreover, medical 
evidence could have proved that Brace was not likely to suffer a debili-
tating heart seizure. This sort of evidence would render unnecessary 
the need for the jury's inferences. Thus, the test in Silver may be 
stricter only because foreseeability can be medically determined. The 
second distinguishing factor is that the Court in Silver was confronted 
with strong policy considerations militating in favor of its decision. 
A contrary finding would have allowed juries to infer from even a 
mild heart attack that the sufferer would now be held to foresee that 
he might, at some future time, suffer an incapacitating heart seizure. 
He would thus be unable to undertake any activity where his "fore-
seeable" incapacity would endanger others without bearing the conse-
quences of tort liability. Such a situation would make even a mod-
erately normal life an impossibility for one who has suffered a mild 
heart seizure. 
§3.2. Medical malpractice. A jury's verdict against a doctor who 
failed to detect and treat the early indicia of a staphylococcus infec-
4Id. at 266-267, 223 N.E.2d at 816. 
51967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 957,227 N.E.2d 344. 
II Jd. at 9119, 227 N ,E.2d at 346. 
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tion in a newborn infant was held to be supported by the evidence in 
Aurelio v. Laird.1 Justice Whittemore, speaking for the Court, summed 
up the evidence supporting a finding of negligence as follows: 
The defendant's own testimony as to the risk and likelihood of 
staphylococcus infection from open wounds in hospitals and that 
redness and swelling about a wound indicates that infection may 
develop, with his testimony and the expert testimony as to the 
importance of early treatment warranted a finding that the de-
fendant should have checked whether infection was developing. 
The jury could have found that he should have arranged to be 
notified immediately if any pus appeared. At the latest, action by 
him was required when the mother, two or three days after she 
had returned home, reported the obvious signs of serious infection 
then observed by her.2 
This was the second case in two years in which a doctor was held 
liable for negligence, not in his manner of treating a patient, but in 
failing to diagnose a patient's condition.s 
An interesting question arises when the holding of the Laird case-
that a physician may be held liable for a negligent diagnosis - is viewed 
from the perspective of the "good samaritan" statute.4 The question 
then becomes whether an emergency diagnosis is considered within the 
ambit of the statute. The answer would appear to be yes. The statute 
speaks in terms of "emergency care and treatment." From the Laird 
case it seems that the Court has subsumed the cause of action for 
negligent diagnosis into the "action for malpractice in respect of the 
care and treatment of plaintiff." Thus, it would appear that a physi-
cian's diagnosis which is volunteered, and is granted "other than in the 
ordinary course of his practice," falls within the protection of the 
statute. 
§3.3. Landlord and tenant. Stapleton v. Cohen1 reaffirmed the 
traditional difficulty of a tenant suing a landlord in tort for negligence. 
In an action brought by a tenant's domestic servant to recover for in-
juries from a fall in a dark hallway, the Supreme Judicial Court ruled 
that in the absence of evidence that the landlord had expressly or im-
pliedly assumed the obligation to provide artificial light at the time of 
day the fall occurred, neither the building code nor the sanitary code 
of the town, both of which imposed a requirement of minimum light-
ing in common passageways, would constitute a basis upon which civil 
liability might be imposed on the landlord. Such codes are essentially 
§3.2. 1 1967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 225, 223 N.E.2d 531. 
2Id. at 228-229, 223 N.E.2d at 533. 
S Pasquale v. Chandler, 350 Mass. 450, 215 N.E.2d 319 (1966), discussed in 1966 
Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §4.9. Previous cases holding a doctor liable for negligent diag-
nosis include Levenson v. Ruble, 307 Mass. 562, 30 N.E.2d 840 (1941); Harriot v. 
Plimpton, 166 Mass. 585, 44 N.E. 992 (1896). 
4 G.L., c. 112, §12B. 
§3.3. 11967 Mass. Adv. Sh. l17I, 228 N.E.2d 64, also noted in §5.2 infra. 
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criminal in nature and do not impose liability "except where the legis-
lative intent appears in express terms or by clear implication";2 nor 
do such codes "affect the mutual relations and duties of landlords and 
tenants as between each other. . .. Violation of the statute had no 
effect as evidence of negligence."3 While the result leaves the class of 
persons intended to be protected by the codes without an effective 
remedy for violation, it is consistent with earlier cases.4 Absent cura-
tive legislation, this case must be considered to reflect the established 
law of the Commonwealth. 
§3.4. Negligence: Farewell to prIVIty. Prior to Carter v. 
Yardley & Co., Ltd.,! the Massachusetts courts declined to find a duty 
upon which a cause of action for negligence could be based in the 
absence of a contractual relationship between the parties.2 In Carter, 
however, Justice Lummus, with abundant citation to authority, de-
clared that "the time has come for us to recognize that that asserted 
general rule no longer exists. In principle it was unsound. It tended 
to produce unjust results. It has been abandoned by the great weight 
of authority elsewhere. We now abandon it in this Commonwealth."3 
If Carter settled the issue with respect to personal injury cases, it 
took until the current SURVEY year to resolve the matter with respect 
to other types of torts. In Craig v. Everett M. Brooks CO.,4 a general 
contractor brought an action of tort against a civil engineer for dam-
ages resulting from the defendant's negligently laying out offset stakes. 
This resulted in two catch basins being designated in wrong locations 
and a road being eight feet out of place, all of which the plaintiff had 
to correct. 
The trial judge directed a verdict for the defendant on the ground 
that "there was no obligation on the part of ... [the defendant] to 
the contractor with whom he had no contract and no relationship."5 
The Supreme Judicial Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Wilkins, 
pointed out that the requirement of privity "was done away with" in 
Carter, and that since the defendant knew the purpose of the staking 
and that the plaintiff would be relying on it, the type and extent of 
any damages were foreseeable; "we are reluctant to perpetuate a dis-
tinction which would be logically indefensible."6 The decision should 
put an end, for all time, to any consideration of contractual privity as 
2Id. at 1173-1174, 228 N.E.2d at 66. 
3 Id., quoting Richmond v. Warren Institution for Savings, 307 Mass. 483, 485, 
30 N.E.2d 407, 408 (1940). 
4 See Campbell v. Romanos, 346 Mass. 361, 191 N.E.2d 764 (1963); Greenway Wood 
Heel Co. v. John Shea Co., 313 Mass. 177, 46 N.E.2d 746 (1943); Richmond v. War-
ren Institution for Savings, 307 Mass. 483, 30 N.E.2d 407 (1940). 
§3.4. 1319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946). 
2 Lebourdais v. Vetrified Wheel Co., 194 Mass. 341, 80 N.E. 482 (1907). 
3319 Mass. at 104, 64 N.E.2d at 700. 
41967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1,222 N.E.2d 752. 
1\ Id. at 2, 222 N.E.2d at 753. 
6Id. at 5, 222 N.E.2d at 755. 
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the standard for determination of the defendant's duty in a negligence 
case. 
§3.5. Deceit. A clerk in a bank erroneously told a mortgage bor-
rower that his life was insured and that part of his monthly payment 
was going to pay for this insurance. Upon his death, it was discovered 
that there was no insurance. In a suit in equity by the borrower's 
widow, the Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the representations were 
of a fact susceptible of actual knowledge, that an intent to deceive was 
not required, and that the widow's damages were the unpaid balance 
of the mortgage.1 In holding that intent to deceive was not necessary 
to hold the defendant liable, the Court adhered to the rule in Massa-
chusetts that, "if a statement of fact which is susceptible of actual 
knowledge is made as of one's own knowledge and is false, it may be 
the basis for an action of deceit without proof of an actual intent to 
deceive."2 The final decree canceled the note and mortgage. 
Although the result reached was the same as that of the trial judge, 
the theory was different. The latter had based his decision on the find-
ing (held to be unsupported by the evidence) that the defendant under-
took to procure insurance on the deceased's life and negligently failed 
to do SO.3 The Court's result is consistent with its holdings in deceit 
cases with reference to intent, as well as with its reluctance to find 
an undertaking to procure insurance as the basis of liability in either 
contract or tort.4 
§3.6. Alienation of affections. A bride, abandoned before the 
honeymoon was over, brought an action in tort against her husband's 
parents and recovered a verdict against both of them.1 The Supreme 
Judicial Court held that evidence that the mother characterized the 
marriage as "a disgrace," made nine attempts to induce her son to 
return home, and kept the plaintiff away from him afterwards was 
sufficient "evidence tending to show that she may have done more than 
was reasonable in the circumstances ... [and] acted with such aggres-
siveness and vehemence as to constitute an abuse of the privilege."2 
The Court held, however, that the evidence was insufficient to make 
out a case against the father, although it showed that he sent his wife 
down one day after the marriage to bring the son home to him, and 
that two days after the marriage the son returned to the father's home 
and never returned to his wife. There was also evidence that he told 
his daughter-in-law, "Peter is not paying you any of this money .... 
§3.5. 1 Robichaud v. Athol Credit Union, 1967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 623, 225 N.E.2d 
347. 
2 Pietrazak. v. McDermott, 341 Mass. 107, llO, 167 N.E.2d 166, 168 (1960). 
31967 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 626, 225 N.E.2d at 349. 
4 See Rayden Engineering Corp. v. Church, 337 Mass. 652, 151 N.E.2d 57 (1958); 
Heaphy v. Kimball, 293 Mass. 414, 200 N.E. 551 (1936). 
§3.6. 1 Poulos v. Poulos, 1967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 123, 222 N.E.2d 887, also noted in 
§4.2 intra. 
2Id. at 127, 222 N.E.2d at 890-891. 
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You'll never get in our family and you'll never get any of our money 
or his money."3 
The Court's disposition of the case against the father is difficult 
to understand. The evidence, all of which was apparently admitted 
without limitation, indicated that the father had instructed his wife 
to go to the location of the honeymoon and to return with his son. 
This would seem to be sufficient to warrant an inference that both 
defendants were acting jointly in pursuance of a common enterprise. 
Certainly, involvement in a crime has been held proved by no more 
evidence than this.4 The fact that the father did not merely acquiesce 
in his wife's actions, but initiated them, would be sufficient to hold 
this a joint enterprise. The Court, however, apparently felt that the 
father's instruction to return with their son was not so serious an abuse 
of the parental privilege of inducement or persuasion5 as to destroy 
it. In effect, the Court found that the policy considerations underlying 
the parental privilege took precedence over the common enterprise 
aspect of the father's actions. 
§3.7. Nuisance. While a barking dog next door may annoy those 
who must listen, an attempt to make an action in tort for "nuisance" 
out of it failed at the demurrer stage.1 The plaintiff sought damages 
for adverse effect to his health, apparently the result of the annoyance, 
based upon the failure of the defendant dog-owner to comply with an 
order that the dog be restrained.2 
There is, of course, ample authority for the proposition that un-
necessary noise which disturbs the neighbors is a nuisance and en-
joinable as such in equity.3 The real answer, perhaps, to the outcome 
of this case is the Court's closing comment to the effect that "it is not 
our function to puzzle out a cause of action and to find authorities to 
support it."4 The plaintiff failed to allege that he had a cause of action 
grounded in the statute5 or to prove the existence of the elements of 
nuisance. This case raises once again the question whether in Massa-
chusetts a plaintiff may recover in tort for nuisance without a showing 
of fault on the part of defendant. The Court here indicates that for a 
plaintiff to prevail in nuisance, he would have to allege that "the de-
fendants' conduct was intentional, wanton or reckless, or negligent."6 
3Id. at 128, 222 N.E.2d at 891. 
4 See Commonwealth v. Chapman, 345 Mass. 251, 186 N.E.2d 818 (1962); Common-
wealth v. Binkiewicz, 342 Mass. 740, 175 N.E.2d 473 (1961); Commonwealth v. 
Greenberg, 339 Mass. 557, 160 N.E.2d 181 (1959). 
5 See 1967 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 126, 222 N.E.2d at 890. 
§3.7. 1 Mills v. Keeler, 1967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 7, 222 N.E.2d 749. 
2 See G.L., c. 140, §157. 
3 See Maim v. Dubrey, 325 Mass. 63, 88 N.E.2d 900 (1949); Weltshe v. Graf, 323 
Mass. 498, 82 N.E.2d 795 (1948); Nugent v. Melville Shoe Corp., 280 Mass. 469, 182 
N.E. 825 (1932). 
4 1967 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 9, 222 N.E.2d at 751. 
5 G.L., c. 130, §157. 
6 1967 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 8, 222 N.E.2d at 751. 
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This holding is consistent with the rule established in other cases that 
liability in such an action ... should be based upon a determi-
nation that the interference is intentional and unreasonable or 
results from conduct which is negligent, reckless or ultrahazard-
ous .... The term "nuisance" ... does not per se bespeak absolute 
liability and it does not relieve the plaintiffs of the burden of 
showing that the conduct of defendant was tortious within the 
above-stated principles.7 
There, thus, could not be a cause of action in nuisance on the basis 
of the declaration in the instant case. Since the plaintiff had no remedy 
in tort, his sole remedy would be in a court of equity to request in-
junctive relief and, perhaps, damages.s 
B. LEGISLATION 
§3.8. Medical immunity. Two 1967 acts of the legislature ex-
tended the immunity of doctors and nurses from liability in tort in 
certain situations. Chapter 374 of the Acts of 1967 amended General 
Laws, Chapter 112, Section 12B, by extending its immunity in emer-
gency treatment cases to registered nurses as well as doctors. Chapter 
309 of the Acts of 1967 inserted a new General Laws, Chapter 112, 
Section 12C, exempting from liability any physician or nurse admin-
istering immunization or other protective measures under public 
health programs. One may seriously question the extension of the 
"good samaritan" doctrine in this latter situation. In spite of its good 
purposes, this type of legislation immunizes the physician at the cost of 
leaving the injured party with no possibility of recovery. 
§3.9. Nuisance. A new lawl makes any person who negligently 
pumps or discharges petroleum or bilge water in any form into water 
so as to cause damage to the property of another liable in tort for 
double damages. This statute complements General Laws, Chapter 91, 
Section 59, which imposes criminal penalties for the pollution or con-
tamination of public waterways by the dumping of petroleum or bilge 
water. 
C. STUDENT COMMENT 
§3.10. Wrongful death statute: Prenatal injuries: Torigian v. 
Watertown News CO.l The defendant was the owner of a vehicle 
which struck an automobile driven by the plaintiff. When the accident 
occurred, the plaintiff was three and one-half months pregnant, a time 
7Ted's Master Service, Inc. v. Farina Bros. Co., 343 Mass. 307, 312, 178 N.E.2d 
268, 271 (1961), noted in 1962 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §3.3. 
S See Nugent v. Melville Shoe Corp., 280 Mass. 469, 182 N.E. 825 (1932). 
§3.9. 1 G.L., c. 91, §59A, inserted by Acts of 1967, c. 507. 
§3.10. 1 1967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 735, 225 N.E.2d 926, also noted in §6.6 infra. 
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at which the fetus is not viable. Two months later the plaintiff's intes-
tate was born. The child lived about two and one-half hours .. The 
plaintiff brought an action in tort, as the child's administrator, to re-
cover damages under the Massachusetts wrongful death statute.2 De-
spite medical testimony that the accident had caused premature birth 
and that the cause of death was prematurity, the trial court granted 
the defendant's motion for a directed verdict. This holding was pre-
sumptively based on the Massachusetts rule that there could be no re-
covery for prenatal injury to a nonviable fetus.3 
The plaintiff appealed the directed verdict. In reversing, the Su-
preme Judicial Court HELD: The plaintiff's intestate was a "person" 
at the time of the injury and, thus, a cause of action could exist under 
the Massachusetts wrongful death statute: 
A person who (1) by his negligence causes the death of a person 
in the exercise of due care, or (2) by willful, wanton, or reckless 
act causes the death of a person under such circumstances that the 
deceased could have recovered damages for personal injuries if 
... death had not resulted ... shall be liable in damages.4 
The Court reasoned that the grounds most frequently used in not 
allowing recovery in prenatal tort cases, "lack of precedent, the 
avoidance of speculation or conjecture, and the encouragement of 
fictitious claims," were no longer valid.5 The vast majority of other 
jurisdictions, the Court noted, have allowed recovery in cases where 
the present issue has arisen.6 The Court further reasoned that the ad-
vancement of medical science lessened the elements of speculation and 
conjecture in proving causation.7 
The Torigian case, while extending Massachusetts tort law to cover 
injuries sustained by a nonviable fetus, poses certain problems: (1) 
whether the child must be born alive to recover under the Massa-
chusetts wrongful death statute, and (2) what standard should be re-
quired for the admittance of scientific evidence in prenatal tort cases. 
These problems are best discussed within the context of the historical 
development of prenatal tort recovery. 
Dietrich v. Northampton8 was the first American case to consider 
the issue of prenatal injury. In Dietrich, a woman who was about five 
months pregnant fell on the defendant's highway, immediately went 
into premature labor and gave birth to an infant who lived only 
fifteen minutes. The plaintiff's administrator brought an action to re-
2 G.L., c. 229, §2. 
3 "The ground of the judge's actions was not expressed, but, as the arguments 
before us indicate, it must have been that there cannot be recovery for prenatal 
injury to a nonviable fetus even where a living child is born." Torigian v. Water-
town News Co., 1967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 735, 736, 225 N.E.2d 926. 
4 G.L., c. 229, §2. 
51967 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 737, 225 N.E.2d at 927. 
6Id. 
7Id. 
8 138 Mass. 14 (1884). 
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cover damages under the predecessor9 of the Massachusetts wrongful 
death statute. In a decision by Justice Holmes, the Court denied re-
covery, holding that it was clear "that the statute sued upon does not 
embrace the plaintiff's intestate within its meaning .... "10 The Court 
justified its decision on the ground that there was no precedent for 
allowing an infant to maintain an action for injuries received while 
in its mother's womb. The Court reasoned that since an unborn child 
was a part of the mother, the mother may maintain an action on her 
own behalf for any injury to the childP Dietrich was cited in many 
subsequent cases denying the right to recover for prenatal injury.12 
During this period when recovery was denied, however, many commen-
tators expressed discontent with the fact that a child could recover for 
injuries incurred only a few hours after birth, whereas a fetus sustain-
ing these same injuries and suffering the same pain would be denied 
relief if the cause of this pain and suffering was something occurring 
just prior to birth.13 Some judges also expressed discontent with the 
Holmes rule.14 
The first case allowing recovery for prenatal injury in the United 
States was Bonbrest v. KotZ.15 Bonbrest involved a malpractice claim 
instituted by the plaintiff's guardian against a physician for negligently 
injuring an infant during the course of delivery. The court in Bon-
brest stressed the importance of the law in keeping pace with medical 
science, which had made much progress since the time of the Dietrich 
decision. The court further stated: 
The absence of precedent should afford no refuge to those who 
by their wrongful act, if such be proved, have invaded the right 
of an individual employed as the defendants were in this case to 
attend, in their professional capacities, both the mother and child. 
And what right is more inherent and more sacrosanct, than that 
of the individual in his possession and enjoyment of his life, his 
limbs and his body?16 
9 Pub. Sts., c. 52. §17 (1881). 
10138 Mass. at 17. 
11 Id. 
12 E.g., Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900); Bue1 v. 
United Rys. Co., 248 Mo. 126, 154 S.W. 71 (1913); Drobner v. Peters. 232 N.Y. 220, 
133 N.E. 567 (1921). 
13 E.g .• Frey, Injuries to Infants en Ventre sa Mere, 12 St. Louis L. Rev. 85 
(1927); A1bertsworth, Recognition of New Interests in the Law of Torts. 10 Calif. L. 
Rev. 461 (1922); Prosser, The Law of Torts §56 (3d ed. 1964). 
14 "The law should. it seems to me, be, that whenever a child in utero is so far 
advanced in prenatal age as that should parturition by natural or artificial means 
occur at such age, such child could and would live separable from the mother and 
grow into the ordinary activities of life, and is afterwards born and becomes a 
living human being, such child has a right of action for any injuries wantonly or 
negligently inflicted upon his or her person at sucl! age of viability, though then 
in the womb of the mother." Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 374, 56 
N.E. 638, 642 (1900) (dissenting opinion). 
1565 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946). The first decision in a state court of last resort 
to grant recovery was Verkennes v. Corniea. 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949). 
1665 F. Supp. at 142. 
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Many states followed the Bonbrest decision, some jurisdictions over-
ruling previous decisions17 and others, considering the problem of pre-
natal injuries for the first time,18 granting relief. 
Despite a judicial trend so obvious that Massachusetts made specific 
note of it as early as 1950,19 the Supreme Judicial Court continued to 
uphold the Dietrich doctrine.20 The Court, in referring to the trend 
of allowing relief for prenatal injuries, stated: 
We readily concede the strength of these grounds [allowing re-
covery], but there is also strength in the arguments to the con-
trary, including that based upon the practical difficulty of reliable 
proof. We do not intimate what our decision would be if the 
question were presented for the first time.21 
Finally in 1960, the Supreme Judicial Court overturned the Dietrich 
doctrine in Keyes v. Construction Service, Inc.22 Keyes involved a pre-
natal injury suffered at a time when the fetus was viable. The Supreme 
Judicial Court held that if the fetus was viable when injured and the 
child was later born alive, such child would have a cause of action for 
any injuries sustained by him because of the wanton or negligent act 
of the defendant.23 In deciding Keyes, the Supreme Judicial Court 
recognized that great progress had been made in medical science and 
that there was a distinct trend of judicial opinion toward allowing re-
covery for prenatal injuries.24 
Torigian extended the Keyes holding to cases where the fetus was 
not viable at the time the injury was inflicted.25 In Keyes, however, 
the Supreme Judicial Court stressed that the plaintiff would have to 
establish that there had been a live birth before recovery would be 
granted under the wrongful death statute. Although Torigian did not 
have to deal with the problem of stillbirth, the Court cited Keyes as a 
basis for allowing recovery for prenatal injuries with no criticism of 
the concomitant requirement that the plaintiff be born alive to main-
tain an action.26 Therefore, there still appears to be a requirement of 
live birth as a prerequisite to recovery under the Massachusetts wrong-
ful death statute. 
The requirement of live birth would be reasonable if Massachusetts 
17 E.g., Amman v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953), overruling Allaire 
v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900); Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 
1224, 258 S.W.2d 577 (1953), overruling Buel v. United Rys. Co., 248 Mo. 126, 154 
S.W. 7 (1913); Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951), overruling 
Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921). 
18 E.g., Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951); Rainey v. Horn, 
221 Miss. 269, 72 So.2d 434 (1954); Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 
249 (1957). 
19 See Bliss v. Passanesi, 326 Mass. 461, 463, 95 N.E.2d 206, 207 (1950). 
20 Cavanaugh v. First National Stores, Inc., 329 Mass. 179, 107 N.E.2d 307 (1952). 
21 Bliss v. Passanesi, 326 Mass. 461, 463, 95 N.E.2d 206, 207 (1950). 
22340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960). 
23Id. at 637, 165 N.E.2d at 915. 
24Jd. at 636-637, 165 N.E.2d at 914-915. 
251967 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 736-737, 225 N.E.2d at 927. 
26Id. 
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had a compensatory-type wrongful death statute.27 A compensatory-
type statute provides that such damages will be awarded as are deemed 
fair and just with reference to the pecuniary loss to the deceased or 
certain of his survivors.28 
When the death occurs before birth or within a short time there-
after, immense complications arise in determining damages, especially 
those relating to loss of earning capacity. Determination of damages is 
speculative because, as stated by the New Jersey Supreme Court in 
Grat v. Taggert: 
It is virtually impossible to predict whether the unborn child, but 
for its death, would have been capable of giving pecuniary bene-
fit to its survivors .... There can be no evidence as to the child's 
capabilities and potentialities. In short, there can be no evidence 
from which to infer pecuniary loss .... 29 
In several states having compensatory-type statutes, therefore, re-
covery has been denied for prenatal injuries when the child is still-
born.30 
Massachusetts, however, has a punitive-type death statute.31 The pur-
pose of a punitive statute is to punish the wrongdoer financially. The 
amount of damages is a function of the culpability of the tortfeasor.s2 
For example, the amount of recovery in a case involving simple negli-
gence would not be as great as in a case involving willful and wanton 
misconduct.3s Thus, in Massachusetts, where the measure of damages 
in the wrongful death statute is based on the culpability of the wrong-
doer and not on the degree of injury to the plaintiff, the fact that the 
injured fetus did not survive birth should not increase the element 
of speculation as to damages. Speculation as to damages, therefore, 
should not be used as an argument against allowing recovery by a 
child stillborn or by one who dies immediately after birth. 
27 There are two types of compensatory death statutes. The first type, modeled 
after Lord Campbell's Act of 1846, 9 8: 10 Viet., c. 93, and known as a death act, 
"creates a new cause of action for the death in favor of the decedent's personal 
representative for the benefit of certain designated persons." The second type, 
known as a survival act, "proceed[s] upon the theory of preserving the cause of 
action vested in the decedent at the moment of his death and enlarging it to include 
the damages resulting from his death." Prosser, note 13 supra, §121, at 924. 
28Id. 
2943 N.J. 303, 310-311, 204 A.2d 140, 144-145 (1964). 
30 E.g., Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 268 P.2d 178 (1954); Acton v. 
Shields, 386 S.W.2d 363 (Mo. 1965); Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 
425 (1966). In spite of the problem of establishing pecuniary loss, however, at least 
five states have allowed recovery for prenatal death. Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 
712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955); Verkennes 
v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949); Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 
72 So.2d 434 (1954); Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957). 
31 "A person who (1) by his negligence causes the death of a person in the 
exercise of due care ... shall be liable in damages ... to be assessed with reference 
to the degree of his culpability." G.L., c. 229, §2 (emphasis added). 
32 Prosser, note 13 supra, §121, at 925. 
88 E.g., City of Mobile v. Reeves, 249 Ala. 488, 31 So.2d 688 (1947). 
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The Torigian action was based on a negligence theory and an action 
based on negligence requires that a duty of due care be owed to the 
injured party.34 This duty must exist at the time the injury is in-
flicted.3s Therefore, in allowing recovery in Torigian, the Supreme 
Judicial Court impliedly held that a duty of due care is owed to an 
infant even before it becomes viable. By not allowing recovery for still-
birth, but allowing recovery when there is a live birth, the Court would 
impliedly hold that a duty of due care was owed in the latter case 
but not in the former. This dichotomy is unreasonable since the de-
fendant's duty would thus be determined retroactively by the final re-
sult of his act. A duty once owed should be always owed, and a viola-
tion of that duty which causes injury should be paid for, especially 
under a statute which is punitive in nature. Furthermore, this dichot-
omy would substantially reward the defendant whose act caused the 
more serious injury. Therefore, it appears unreasonable that stillbirth 
should bar recovery under the Massachusetts wrongful death statute. 
The Torigian Court, in recognizing the advancement of medical sci-
ence in the area of prenatal injury,36 has raised a second problem: the 
standard that should be required for the admission of scientific evi-
dence in prenatal tort cases. Expert testimony is used in areas where 
the jury lacks knowledge of the subject matter.37 In such cases, the 
jury will usually rely heavily on expert testimony when making find-
ings.3S The court must, therefore, require that expert testimony main-
tain a certain standard of acceptance as a prerequisite to consideration. 
It has been suggested that such testimony must achieve general scien-
tific acceptance before it is admitted for consideration.39 General 
scientific acceptance may be defined as that state of acceptance where 
the theory in question is almost unanimously accepted as a valid 
theory by the scientific community.40 General scientific acceptance may 
not be difficult to achieve in most fields of medicine, but the field of 
prenatal injury is not as developed as other fields. Hence, application 
of such a standard may often result in the denial of recovery. For 
example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in a case involving injury to 
a pregnant woman who later gave birth to a mongoloid child, denied 
recovery, holding that the theories on which the plaintiff's expert wit-
ness based his opinion had not been "sufficiently established to have 
gained general acceptance in the particular medical field in which they 
belong."41 Because the science of obstetrics has only been recently ex-
panded,42 it is not likely that the theories of this science will have 
34 Winfield, Duty in Tortious Negligence, 34 Colum. L. Rev. 41, 43 (1934). 
35 Cf. Restatement (Second) of Torts §4 (1965). 
36 See 1967 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 737, 225 N.E.2d at 927. 
37 1 Belli, Modern Trials §59 (1954). 
3S See 2 Jones, The Law of Evidence §412 (5th ed. 1958). 
39Id. §412, at 774. 
4Q Cf. Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013 (D.D.C. 1923). 
41 Puhl v. Milwaukee Automobile Insurance Co., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 354, 99 N.W.2d 
163, 169 (1959). 
42 Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge on the Law Relating to Prenatal 
Injuries, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 554, 592 (1962). 
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gained "general acceptance." Therefore, requiring a test as rigid as 
one would require in more developed areas of medicine may well have 
the practical effect of denying recovery to a great many legitimate 
prenatal tort claims. 
Because the general acceptance standard may deny a number of 
legitimate claims, a less stringent test appears desirable. One possible 
solution is to require that the theory the expert relies on must have 
achieved acceptance by a recognized school of thought or at least 
that the school be willing to recognize the exponent as a leading 
authority in the relevant field in inquiry.43 The advantage of this 
standard is that it would take cognizance of the fact that medical 
recognition of prenatal injury is a newly developing area in which it 
may be impossible to gain general or near unanimous acceptance of 
scientific theories. Furthermore, it would be a standard rigid enough 
to prevent mere speculation from being admitted as expert testimony. 
The extension of tort liability to permit recovery for injury to the 
nonviable fetus appears to be a progressive step in tort law because it 
discards the artificial distinction between viability and nonviability. 
As discussed above, however, Torigian does raise certain problems. 
These problems do not appear to be insurmountable. First, to correct 
the arbitrary distinction between live birth and stillbirth, an amend-
ment to the wrongful death statute could extend its coverage to those 
stillborn. As the statute is punitive this amendment presents no prob-
lems of establishing damages with respect to the child's worth. Thus, 
an extension of Torigian to include injuries to fetuses not born alive 
would be logical and practical. Second, to help solve the problem of 
scientific testimony, a panel of experts could be established to assist 
the courts. Such a panel would have the dual function of insuring that 
scientific evidence attain a desired level of certainty before a jury 
could consider it and of assisting the judge and the jury to better 
comprehend the inter-relationship between the act of a defendant and 
the injury to the child. 
CHARLES K. MQNE 
§3.11. Resale price maintenance: Fair Trade Law: Shulton, Inc. v. 
Consumer Value Stores, Inc.1 Shulton, a New Jersey toilet article 
manufacturer, entered into fair trade contracts with Massachusetts re-
tailers, as permitted by the Massachusetts Fair Trade Law.2 The con-
tracts listed more than two hundred Shulton products and the mini-
mum retail prices at which they could be sold. Consumer Stores, a 
Massachusetts retailer who sells Shulton products, was notified of these 
contracts but did not sign them.3 Under the Massachusetts Fair Trade 
Law, a retailer who has notice of a fair trade contract is bound by the 
43 See Id. at 599. 
§3.11. 11967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 933, 227 N.E.2d 482. 
2 G.L.. c. 93. §§14A-14D. 
3 Record at 14. 
.' 
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prices stipulated in the contract regardless of whether he signed it.4 
Only if the manufacturer seeking to enforce the contract fails to 
meet certain statutory conditions is the retailer not obligated to ad-
here to the price schedule.5 
Shulton filed a bill in equity in the Superior Court to enjoin Con-
sumer Stores from selling its products at prices below those stipulated 
in the fair trade contracts. Shulton served Consumer Stores with a 
notice to admit the fact that Shulton's products were in fair and open 
competition with products of the same general classes produced by 
others.6 Consumer Stores did not reply to the notice. 
The case was submitted to a master who found that Shulton ade-
quately enforced its fair trade contracts, and that Consumer Stores 
sold below the prices stipulated in the contracts. He also found that 
other toilet-article manufacturers sold products similar to Shulton's in 
Massachusetts. With respect to one item, Old Spice after shave lotion, 
there were detailed findings of price competition. The master con-
cluded from this evidence that Shulton's products were in "fair and 
open competition" with commodities of the same general classes pro-
duced by others; that Consumer Stores had violated the Fair Trade 
Law by knowingly selling Shulton products below the prices stipulated 
in the contract; and that Shulton was entitled to the relief for which 
it prayed.7 
Consumer Stores appealed from a Superior Court decree which con-
firmed the master's report and granted an injunction. In reversing and 
remanding for additional fact findings, the Supreme Judicial Court 
HELD: to enjoin a nonsigning, Massachusetts retailer from selling fair-
traded products below the prices stipulated in the contract, a manu-
facturer has the burden of going forth with substantial evidence that 
these products are in fair and open competition with commodities of 
4 G.L., c. 93, §14B, states: "Wilfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale 
or selling any commodity at less than the price stipulated in any contract entered 
into pursuant to the preceding section, whether the person so advertising, offering 
for sale or selling is or is not a party to such contract, is hereby declared to con-
stitute unfair competition and to be actionable at the suit of any person damaged 
thereby." 
5 The conditions which the manufacturer must meet are (a) his product must 
be trademarked, G.L., c. 93, §14A; (b) his products must be in fair and open com-
petition with products of the same general class produced by others, id.; (c) he 
must adequately enforce his contract against all retailers, General Electric Co. v. 
Kimball Jewelers, Inc., 333 Mass. 665, 132 N.E.2d 652 (1956); (d) he must either 
file the necessary papers required of foreign corporations under G.L., c. 181, §§3, 
5, 12, or be exempt as a foreign corporation engaged exclusively in interstate 
commerce, Remington Arms Co. v. Lechmere Tire 8: Sales Co., 339 Mass. 131, 158 
N.E.2d 134 (1959). 
6 A party to a suit may serve notice upon another party to admit for the purposes 
of only that suit any material facts. "If the party upon whom such demand is made 
refuses to admit any fact •.. the reasonable expense of proving such fact • . . as 
determined after summary hearing by the justice presiding at the trial, shall, un-
less the justice certifies that the refusal to admit was reasonable, be paid by said 
party to the other party ••.. " G.L., c. 2!11, §69. 
7 Record at !14. 
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the, same, general class produced by others. This burden is not satisfied 
b,y evidence that other'productso{ the same general classes are sold 
in the same geographical area, by a notice to admit facts, or by evidence 
that one of the items listed in the contract is in fair and open com-
petition with similar products. The Court affirmed the decree as to 
only one item (Old Spice after shave lotion), holding that the findings 
a,s to.the extent of competition, in regard to this item, were adequately 
detailed. The only evidence with which the Court was presented in 
regard to this item was a showing that "[s]everal other lotions made by 
various producers retail at approximately the same price" as Old 
Spice.8 
The Court's decision can be read in two possible ways. Either the 
Court has taken the position that, in the absence of any other evidence 
of fair and open competition, it is necessary to show very close price 
similarity among competing products, or it has taken the position that 
price similarity is the sole standard by which to determine fair and open 
competition. For several reasons, it is logical to conclude that the Court 
has taken the latter position. First, if the Court was adopting the for-
mer view, then it would seem incumbent on it to say so explicitly, and 
even suggest other possible criteria of fair and open competition. The 
Court, however, spoke exclusively in terms of price similarity. Second, 
without going into the same detail as it did on price competition, the 
mastet'ssubsidiary findings noted that Shulton products were sold 
primarily in drugstores, supermarkets and discount houses, as were at 
least three other brands.9 The record also disclosed that Shulton ad-
vertised on ,a national scale,lO although it did not mention the scope 
of other brands' advertising. Thus, factors other than price similarity 
which would be relevant to a determination of "fair and open compe-
tition" - the extent and manner of advertising and the type of retail 
outlet in which a product is sold - were readily ascertainable from the 
record. The Court in Shulton, however, did not mention these factors. 
Third, the Court ignored the fact that toilet articles are luxury items. 
Price, t'Q,Qugh of some significance, is not nearly as significant to the 
consumer buying a luxury item as it is to one buying a necessity. The 
Court's exclusive reliance on price similarity in a market where price is 
one of the less significant factors of competition could imply that other 
fat tors, are irrelevant to a determination of fair and open competition. 
If price similarity is the sole standard by which to determine fair 
and open competition, two important questions are raised: (1) whether 
it is consistent with the policy of the Fair Trade Law to rely exclusively 
on price similarity; and (2) whether it will be possible or practical, in 
light of this narrow construction of the statute for a manufacturer to 
enforce his fair trade contracts against nonsigners. 
It is dearly consistent with the act to require a showing that a 
product; to be fair-traded, is in fair and open competition with corn~ 
',: iIt 1967M3:lIs;' Adv. Sh.at935, 227 N.E.2dat 484. 
9 Record at 21. 
10Id. at 22. 
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modi ties of the same general class produced by others. V It is subc 
mitted, however, that the Court's ruling that the question of fair and 
open competition cannot be decided by a notice to admit facts. reflects 
a judicial hostility toward the act by making it Illoredifficult for a 
producer attempting to enforce his fair trade contracts to carry the 
burden of proof. It is further submitted that it is inconsistent with the 
policy of the Fair Trade Law to limit the required evidence to a show-
ing of close similarity of prices among products of the same general 
class. As a result of this decision it may be impractical for a manu-
facturer to attempt to enforce his fair trade contracts agaillst non-
signers in Massachusetts. . 
The policy underlying the Massachusetts Fair Trade Law reflected 
the attitude that manufacturers of trademarked products in a competi-
tive market should be allowed to protect themselves from certain prac-
tices which were considered injurious to the goodwill of their brand 
name or trademark.12 The act allows the manufacturer, withoutviblat-
ing the Sherman Act13 or any state laws, to set the .pricesat which 
his products will be retailed. To set the prices,the manUfacturer must 
enter into fair trade contracts with retailers. These contracts stipulate 
the retail prices at which the manufacturer's trademarked products 
may be sold.14 The signing retailers are bound to observe these prices 
11 G.L., c. 93, §14A: "No contract relating to the sale or resale of a commodity 
which bears, or the label or container of which bears, or the 'vending equipment 
from which said commodity is sold to consumers bears, the trademark, brand. or 
name of the producer or owner of such commodity and which is' in fair and open 
competition with commodities of the same general class produced by others shall 
be deemed in violation of any law of the commonwealth by reason of any Qf 
the following provisions which may be contained in such contract: 
(I) That the buyer will not resell such commOdity except at the price stipulated 
by the vendor. 
(2) That the producer or vendee of a commodity require upon the sale of such 
commodity to another, that such purchaser agree that he will not, in turn, 'resell 
except at the price stipulated by such producer or vendee .... " 
12 Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Elm Farm Foods (;Q., 337 Mass. 221, 228-229, 148 
N.E.2d 861, 866 (1958). . . . . ' . • 
13 State fair trade acts were made possible in 1937 by the passage Qf theMille~­
Tydings Amendment to the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. §15 (1964). Prior to that time, 
attempts by manufacturers to fix resale prices on goods sol4 in interstate com~ 
merce were considered in restraint of trade and, therefore, in violation of the 
Sherman Act. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220U.S. 373 (19ilI. 
The United States Supreme COlll;t held that the fair trade laws of Illinois and 
California did not violate the Constitution by permitting manufacturers to enter 
price-fixing agreements with respect to "identified" go~ds. Old Dearborn Distribut-
ing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936); The Pep Boys, Mann..y, 
Moe & Jack of California, Inc. v. Pyroil Sales Co., 299 U.S.198 (1936). The Miller-
1;'ydiJ:lgs Act was passed to give statutory approval to fair tradl;! legislation. However, 
it was construed not to validate the nonsigner clauses of these acts. Sch'I;Vegmann 
Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384.(1951). Trusled to the passage of the 
McGuire Act, further amending the Sherman Act to' IiI<lke nonsigner .clauses valid. 
15 U.S.C. §45(a)(3) (1964). The constitutionality of the Act has peen llPheld. Norman 
M. Morris Corp. v. Hess Bros., 243 F.2d· 274 (3d Cit. 1957)~.Sl,lnbeam Corp .. v. 
Richardson, 243 F.2d 501 (6th Cir. 1957). '. 
14 The Fair Trade Law applies with equal force to fair trade contracts between 
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under traditional contract theory. The effectiveness of the act, how-
ever, lies in the fact that the manufacturer may also enforce the con-
tract against all retailers selling his product, regardless of whether they 
have signed the contract.15 This prevents nonsigning retailers from 
selling the product as a "loss leader,"16 below the fair trade price. 
In theory, when a brand-name product is sold as a "loss leader" it 
is degraded in the consumer's eyes and, therefore, goodwill is injured. 
A commodity that is not in a competitive market, such as a unique 
product, may not be fair-traded because there would be nothing to 
prevent that manufacturer from setting artificially high prices,17 
Theoretically, in the case of a product that is in a competitive market, 
such as one that is not unique, the mechanics of open competition 
would prohibit the manufacturer from setting his price too high, as 
he would lose sales to his more reasonably priced competitors.18 It can 
be seen, therefore, that a showing that the product to be fair-traded is 
in free and open competition is consistent with the policies of the 
Fair Trade Law. 
Massachusetts, following the general trend of the states at the time,19 
passed its Fair Trade Law in 1937. It was not until 1956 however, in 
General Electric Co. v. Kimball Jewelers, Inc.,2o that the validity of the 
Act was challenged. The fact situation was very similar to that in 
Shulton. General Electric brought a bill to enjoin a nonsigning retailer 
from selling appliances below the prices stipulated in General Elec-
tric's fair trade contracts. The retailer challenged the constitutionality 
of the Act, claiming it was an unlawful delegation of legislative power 
and a deprivation, without due process, of the nonsigning retailer's 
right to determine the prices at which he could sell his goods. In af'< 
firming the trial court's issuance of an injunction, the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court held that the Fair Trade Law was not an unlawful dele-
gation of power by the Massachusetts legislature, and that the 
nonsigner clause21 did not violate the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 
manufacturers and wholesalers. G.L., c. 93, §14A. The discussion here has been 
limited to the manufacturer-retailer contract because of the fact situation in 
Shulton. 
15 G.L., c. 93, §14B. Without the nonsigner clause the Act is really ineffective 
since those who do not sign are the ones who are most likely to sell below the 
fair trade prices. 
16 A product is sold as a "loss leader" when a retailer sells a well-known brand 
at a very low price to attract customers into his store, where presumably they 
will also buy other items in the store. Corey, Fair Trade Pricing: A Reappraisal, 
30 Harv. Bus. Rev. 47, 55 (Sept.-Oct. 1952). 
17 The Fair Trade Law does not provide any standard by which the manufacturer 
is to set his prices. It is logical to assume that market conditions were considered 
sufficient to determine what is a reasonable price. 
18 See 1967 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 936, 227 N.E.2d at 484-485. 
19 2 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 1\6017. 
2Q 333 Mass. 665, 132 N.E.2d 652 (1956). 
21 G.L., c. 93, §14B. 
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The Kimball decision has remained the law in Massachusetts.22 In 
other states, however, there has been a recent trend to invalidate fair 
trade laws on constitutional grounds.23 Taking notice of this trend, 
the Supreme Judicial Court in Shulton reaffirmed Massachusetts' mi-
nority position, saying: "We are not asked to reconsider [the Kimball 
holding] and we are not so disposed now to make a retroactive reinter-
pretation of legislative intent on a matter which is largely one of 
policy."24 
Whether or not the constitutional questions are closed, the Shulton 
Court, in placing a strict construction on the requirements of the Fair 
Trade Law, has weakened its effectiveness. Relatively few cases involv-
ing the Fair Trade Law have reached the Supreme Judicial Court. In 
those which have, none of the records contained more evidence that 
the products were in fair and open competition than appeared in 
Shulton. In these past decisions, the Court either completely passed 
over the lack of evidence25 or permitted the question of fair and open 
competition to be resolved by a notice to admit facts.26 
In Shulton, the record included a notice to admit the fact that the 
items listed in Shulton's fair trade contract were in fair and open com-
petition with commodities of the same general classes produced by 
other manufacturers.27 As the Court pointed out, Consumer Stores was 
faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, if it admitted the fact, it 
would have conceded much of the case. On the other hand, if it denied 
the fact, it would run the risk of paying Shulton's expenses of proving 
the fact.28 Therefore, Consumer Stores did not respond at all. The 
22 Nevertheless, there has been much criticism of this sort of reasoning. See 
Bates, Constitutionality of State Fair Trade Acts, 32 Ind. L.J. 127 (1957); Conant, 
Resale Price Maintenance: Constitutionality of Nonsigner Clauses, 109 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 539 (1961); Corey, Fair Trade Pricing: A Reappraisal, 30 Harv. Bus. Rev. 47 
(Sept.-Oct. 1952). 
23 Of the forty-six states that have passed fair trade acts, twenty-nine have held 
that their acts in general are constitutional (four by lower courts), four have held 
them unconstitutional and nine have not passed on the question. Eighteen have 
held the nonsigner clause constitutional, twenty-two have declared it unconstitu-
tional and two have not considered the issue. Four have repealed it altogether. 
2 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 1[6041. 
241967 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 934, 227 N.E.2d at 483. 
25 General Electric Co. v. Kimball Jewelers, Inc., 333 Mass. 665, 132 N.E.2d 652 
(1956) (record included a price list of fifty-eight items, but no evidence that any of 
them were in fair and open competition); Remington Arms Co. v. Lechmere Tire 
& Sales Co., 339 Mass. 131, 158 N.E.2d 134 (1959) (record included a twelve-page 
price list for firearms and one of fourteen pages for ammunition, but there was 
only one sentence in the record dedicated to the finding that all of these items 
were in fair and open competition). 
26 E. I. du Pont de Nemours Be Co. v. Kaufman Be Chernick, Inc., 337 Mass. 216, 
148 N.E.2d 634 (1958); Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Elm Farm Foods Co., 337 Mass. 
221, 148 N.E.2d 861 (1958) (the question of fair and open competition was resolved 
by stipulations of fact). 
27 Record at 111-14. 
28 GL., c. 231, §69. 
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Court ruled that whether a product is in fair and open competition 
is the very issue in contention and, therefore, it cannot be resolved by 
anotke to admit fac.:ts.29 
It is clearlyconsistent.with the policy of the Fair Trade Law to re" 
quire that a manufacturer bear the burden of producing evidence that 
his product is in fair and open com.petition. In light, however, of the 
act's judicial history, which, reveals no particular emphasis on this re-
quirement, the holding in Shulton would appear to have no basis in 
either. previous decisions or in the legislative history. 
It is.not clear that it is consistent with the policy of the act to require 
substantial evidenceo! price similarity in order to prove a product is 
in' fair and open compl:!tition. In Slzulton, there was ample evidence of 
the prices of Old Spice's competitors.so The Court's ruling that this 
evidence was sufficient indicates that a substantially close relation 
between price and quantity is the standard by which to determine 
whether a product iiI in fair and open competition. The Court noted 
that the evidence showed Shuhon's expensive after shave lotion retails 
at $3.50 for six ounces and that Old Spice, its lower priced, popular 
brand, retails at $1.25 fox four and three-quarter ounces. Th,e evidence 
also disclosed that several lotions made by other producers "retail at 
approximately. the same·price as [Old Spice]. The only lotion which 
retails for aboutthesameprice't as Shulton's expensive lotion is sold 
byJade East at $3.00 to $.3.50 for four ounces.S1 It was held that the 
evidence was sufficient to find Old Spice in fair and open competition 
with other brands, but there was insufficient evidence for a finding that 
Shulton's expensive lotion was in competition with Jade East. It was 
1).ot indicated whether all. of the lotions offered as evidence or only 
SOme of .the more closely priced ones were in fair and open competition 
with Old Spice. It would appear that the Court found the difference 
of 29¢ per ounce between Jade East and Shulton'sexpensive lotion 
too great for thelqtions to be in .fair and open competition. It is not 
(;l~ar, however,at whatpdce the Court would have f(mnd tre lotions 
to be in competition. 
The Court made no mention of other elements which would seem to 
be significant; if Ilotcrucial, in determining whether a product is in 
fair and open competition wit}:l, .. other products;Fore~ample,. Shulton 
maY'S,ell the same quantity of OIdS.pice as another manufacturer sells 
2fj Hl67Mass. Adv. Sh. at .9$6.937, 227N~E.2dat 484-485. 
3~F:igures in chart drawn from Recprd at 22, 
RETAIL PRICE DIFFERENCE 
, QUANTIIT 'RETAIL PRICE FROM OLD SPICE 
I}RAND <in ounces) PRICE' (per ounce) (per ounce) 
Old.SpiC~ .. $1.25 $.263 
Mennen's .Citation 1.25 .263 $.000 
Yardley l.00 .242 .. 021 
Command 1.00 .200. ;063 
Mennen Skin Bracer .79 .174 .089 
Aqua Velva .99 .165 .098 
811967 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 935, 227 N.E.2d at 484. (Emphasis added.) 
19
Sherer: Chapter 3: Torts
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1967
§3.11 TORTS '55 
of Brand X, at the same price. On the one hand, Brand X may be 
distributed only in New England, seldoIll advertised, and on the 
market for only a year. Old Spice, on the other hand, is a national 
brand, is extensively advertised and has been on the market for a long 
time. It is clear that these other market factors influence the competi-
tion between the two products and should, therefore, be factors looked 
to in determining fair and open competition. 
Interpreting the Fair Trade Law to require that a manufacturer 
show that his products are close to or identically priced with other 
similar commodities, the Court reached a result which is logically and 
practically inconsistent with the Fair Trade Law. A product that is not 
in competition with anything may not be fairctraded.A product that 
is in a competitive market is subject to the inherent limitation of the 
market; if it is overpriced it will lose sales to lower-priced competition. 
If identity of price is the sole standard by which to determine fair 
and open competition, a practical problem arises. In an industry with 
a small number of producers, manufacturers who want to fair~trade 
their products must, in order to adhere to the Court's standard, price 
their products closely or identically with the products of all other 
producers; that is to say, they must engage in "conscious price paral-
lelism," which, in turn, incurs the risk of a Sherman ActS2 violation. 
Conscious price parallelism, or price leadership, is the practice of fixing 
prices without entering any actual agreement or understanding.ss One 
manufacturer, usually the industry's largest, is the price leader. The 
leader announces the prices at which his products are to be sold, and 
the other manufacturers then adjust their prices accordingly. For 
example, if Shulton were the price leader in the toilet article industry, 
and announced that its most popular lotion, Old Spice, was to retail 
at 25¢ per ounce, then the remaining producers in the industry would 
adjust the price of their most popular lotion to 25¢ per ounce or very 
close to it. This creates price stabilization by eliminating price com-
petition. 
If competitors were to agree formally to act in this parallel 
fashion they would be guilty of conspiracy to fix prices under the 
Sherman Act. In conscious parallelism, however, there are none of the 
elements of a formal agreement, such as meetings, discussions, ex-
change of price information, commitments or promises to adhere to 
the prices, and therefore, there is technically no violation of the Sher-
man Act. Thus, while parallel action is not itself a violation of the 
Sherman Act,34 it can be evidence of such a violation. "To be sure, 
business behavior is admissible circumstantial evidence from which the 
fact finder may infer agreement."S5 
S226 Stat. 209 (1890). 15 U.S.C. §1 (1964). 
S3 For a good general discussion. see Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under 
the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 
655 (1962). 
34 Theatre Enterprises. Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp .• 346 U.S. 537, 
541 (1954). 
35Id. at 540. See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226 (1939). 
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Assuming a situation where the industry is both able to effect a 
policy of conscious price parallelism and to avoid successfully liability 
under the Sherman Act, the manufacturer is in a position to enforce 
fair trade contracts in Massachusetts. This would eliminate price com-
petition, leaving the consumer without any price choice and, most 
likely, with artificially high prices. The result, therefore, would be in-
consistent with the policy of the Fair Trade Law. 
In narrowly construing the requirements of the Fair Trade Law by 
emphasizing only the price factor of fair and open competition, the 
Supreme Judicial Court has reached a conclusion which is inconsistent 
with the policy of the act and which restricts its effectiveness to the 
limited situations where the manufacturer has priced his product close 
to, or identically with, other similar products. The result of this con-
struction, plus an apparent judicial hostility toward the act in not 
allowing the use of a notice to admit facts, is that manufacturers will 
find it difficult to enforce their fair trade contracts unless the Court 
or the legislature makes additional factors, such as advertising and 
market scope, available for the determination of whether the item is in 
fair and open competition. 
R. JOSEPH PARKER 
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